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Tech Dominance and the Policeman at the Elbow
Tim Wu†
Introduction
What drives the “digital tornado” (to use the evocative phrase coined by Kevin
Werbach) or the cycle of “creative destruction,” the fierce, concentrated winds of
technological change? One school of thought sees it as an entirely private process,
driven by brave scientists, risk-taking entrepreneurs, and the capital markets. It
sometimes adds the idea that the rate of technological change is always accelerating,
meaning that, today, technology is changing faster than ever. And if government is
relevant, it is merely through guaranteeing property rights and contract; otherwise it
does best by staying out of the way.
But what if powerful firms seek to slow down, modulate, or co-opt the winds of
change? The view just describes take this impossible, for it is axiomatic that the rate of
technological change is always accelerating, so that any firm or institution dependent on
a given technology is automatically doomed to a rapid obsolescence. It follows that even
well-meaning laws designed to catalyze innovation, at best, merely risk interfering with a
natural progression toward a better technological future, hindering “the march of
civilization.” As the general counsel of Standard Oil once put it, government cannot
control the aggregation of private power: “You might as well endeavor to stay the
formation of the clouds, the falling of the rains, or the flowing of the streams.”1
This view was widely held in the early 2000s through the 2010s, has great
relevance for the antitrust law, the subject of this essay, and particularly, the parts of the
law concerned with monopolization. For if we can indeed assume that the rate
technological innovation is always accelerating, it follows that there can be no such thing
as lasting market power, the concern of the law. The dominant firm, necessarily
dependent on an older technology, will be quickly surpassed and replaced by a new firm.
In its strongest version it suggests that the anti-monopoly portions of the antitrust law
are obsolete.
Over the 1980s through 2010s a series of powerful anecdotes supported this
narrative, so much that it became a broadly accepted wisdom. After all, IBM, in the
1970s and 1980s, once thought lord of everything, was bested by a college drop-out
named Bill Gates and a few of his friends. Microsoft, in turn, was ravaged by a series of
†

Julius Silver Professor, Columbia Law School. This essay benefited from comments by Kevin Werbach,
discussions with Randy Picker, and an illuminating conversation with Bill Gates.
1
Quoted in Tim Wu, the Curse of Bigness (2017).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3342598

garage-startups with goofy names like Yahoo!, Google and Facebook. AOL rose and then
fell like a rocket that fails to achieve orbit, as did other firms, like MySpace and
Netscape. The chaos and rapid change made it obvious to many there could be no such
thing as a lasting monopoly. A three-year old firm was middle-aged; a five-year old firm
almost certainly near death, for “barriers to entry” were a 20th century concept. The
best, indeed the only thing the antitrust law should do is to stand back and watch.
But what if the supposed new order itself was itself just a phase? What if the
assumption of constant accelerating technological change is wrong – or a function of
market structure? As these questions may suggest, this paper joins the challenge to the
narrative described above. I say join because it is a larger conversation, not to be settled
with one paper. The goal of this paper the contribution is to examine a foundational
part of the narrative– the erosion of IBM’s dominance in the 1970s and the case of United
States v. IBM.
Why focus on IBM? The decline of IBM’s dominance over the 1980s has long been a
foundational part of the story that we described in the introduction, one that casts the
“new economy” as an exception to the usual rules of industrial organization. As the story
goes, IBM, bested by Microsoft, Compaq, Dell, Intel and other competitors, serves as
strong proof that lasting monopoly in unachievable in high tech industries. Even mighty
IBM could not hold out, given the inevitable challenge from new inventions and
innovators.
Unfortunately, that account tends to overlook the fact that IBM was not just subject
to the forces of technological change, but also a significant legal challenges, targeted
directly at the exercise of monopoly power. This essay suggests, with the benefit of
decades of hindsight, that subjecting IBM to an antitrust lawsuit and trial actually
catalyzed numerous transformational developments key to the growth and innovation in
the computing industries. The undeniable fact is that “policeman at the elbow” can and
does change conduct. The IBM case put a policeman at the elbow of the world’s
dominant computer firm during a crucial period of change and development in the
technology industries. This, I suggest, aided an ongoing process of transformational or
Schumpeterian innovation.2 Contrary to conventional wisdom, I also think that United
States v. IBM is a valuable guide to enforcement policy in the technology-centered
industries. This paper, in short, is a revisionist history of the IBM case, one that casts
serious doubt on the narrative of law’s irrelevance in aiding technological change.
The goal is not just to give the IBM case its due among those who study law and
technology, but also rehabilitate its reputation within the antitrust law, where it is given
conventional wisdom has not been kind. United States v. IBM has been cast as among
antitrust’s lowest moments, and among the Justice Department’s greatest mistakes.
2
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Robert Bork memorably dubbed the litigation “Antitrust’s Vietnam”; Joseph Lopatka
termed it a “monument to arrogance”; while an appellate judge quipped that it “went on
longer than World War II and probably cost as much.”3 Lasting from 1969 through
1982, the case included a 6-year trial; the government’s presentation took 104,000 pages
of transcript, while for its part, IBM called 856 witnesses and cited 12,280 exhibits. Yet
after years of trial, the Justice Department withdrew the case in 1982, without
settlement or judicial remedy. The failure of the case to reach a verdict added
ammunition to a Reagan-era movement against antitrust’s “big case” tradition.4 This has
yielded, for many, one lasting “lesson” from IBM: that “big antitrust” — the industryclearing Section 2 cases — should be used sparingly, at best, given the costs and
potential for failure.
This essay challenges the conventional wisdom and suggests that the IBM lawsuit
and trial, despite never reaching a verdict, actually catalyzed numerous transformational
developments key to the growth and innovation of the computing industries.
I do not seek to defend everything about the IBM trial. It is admittedly difficult, if
not impossible, to defend the manner in which the Justice Department and court
managed the litigation and allowed it to last so long. It is also true, as the critics have
charged, that the Government could have had a clearer theory from the outset. However,
despite the lack of a remedy, the historic materials made available since the litigation
have made it clear that the antitrust case did substantially change IBM’s behavior in
specific ways. Perhaps the most important was the case’s role in pushing IBM to
unbundle its software offerings from its hardware, and therefore leave room for the birth
of an independent software industry. While the effects are less direct, the case seems to
have also influenced the manner of IBM’s PC launch and its conduct thereafter. These
developments appear to have at least contributed to the thriving of an independent
computer software industry, and later, to a new market for competing, IBM-compatible
personal computers, as well as a slew of related, independent industries in storage,
processing, printing, modems, and otherwise. During this period, IBM’s avoidance of
exclusive contracts and its failure to acquire or seek control of obvious targets (like
Microsoft itself) all suggest a firm with “antitrust phobia,” and thereby one that allowed
competition to flourish.
Of course, there were a great number of other factors in the late 1970s affecting
the software and hardware industries, and there is no claim here that the IBM antitrust
litigation drove everything that happened during this era. However, many of the existing
narratives are too quick to assume that the developments were “inevitable,” or,
alternatively, all the byproduct of the particular genius of Bill Gates, a favorite thesis of
3

Steven Brill, What to Tell Your Friends About IBM, AMERICAN LAWYER (Apr. 1982), at 1.
See GARY L. REBACK, FREE THE MARKET!: WHY ONLY GOVERNMENT CAN KEEP THE MARKETPLACE COMPETITIVE
(2009); William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act
as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (1989).
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the Microsoft-centered books. As discussed earlier, it is well understood by legal scholars
that both firms and individuals may behave differently when enforcement is more likely,
especially “with a policeman at the elbow.”5 The operating theory of this paper is that a
pending monopolization case, which focuses on exclusionary and anticompetitive acts
and scrutinizes efforts to dominate new industries, may affect firm conduct in
recognizable ways. And the thesis is that the policeman standing at the elbow of the
dominant computing firms during the 1970s and early 1980s had an important impact
on the development of the software and personal computing industries.
This reexamination of IBM also has important implications for antitrust
enforcement policy, for an enforcer interested in “big cases” in the tech industries filed
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. To say that has, in the late 2010s, regained
relevance is to state the obvious. For since the 00s, when it seemed that market power
was indeed always going to be fleeting, the tech industries have consolidated into a
much smaller number of “big tech” firms. The question, therefore, or when to bring a
big tech case and against whom has returned to first order importance.
This paper suggests three things. First, that Government lawyers should look for
situations where it appears that a single firm is sitting as gatekeeper upon what might,
plausibly, be several innovative industries, and where breakups or lesser remedies might
therefore unleash substantial growth. Specifically, beyond the usual search for
monopoly power and anticompetitive practices, enforcers should be looking for
“bundled” or “tied” markets that have the potential to be those nascent industries. The
presence of stunted, cottage industries might suggest an underlying potential. Second,
the IBM case suggests the importance of a credible threat — i.e., an investigation that
seeks dissolution or other important remedies — so as to induce actual changes in
conduct and deter anticompetitive behavior. Finally, the IBM case cautions enforcers to
be concerned, but not overly concerned with the costs of investigation and trial, which
are multi-million dollars questions, when there are billions and possibly trillions at
stake.
Part I provides background, Part II describes the litigation, Part III the impact of
the litigation, and Part IV potential insight for enforcers.
I.

Background: The Company and the Market

The predecessor firm to International Business Machines was founded in 1911, as
a manufacturer of machines for tabulating and data processing. By the 1960s, IBM had
5
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become a dominant manufacturer of general purpose, or “mainframe” computers
designed to be used by corporations, government agencies, and other large institutions.
“Big Blue” was, by then, the largest computer manufacturer in the world. By 1971, IBM
had grown to 258,662 employees and $7.2 billion in annual revenues, and its IBM
System/360 was the nation’s, and indeed the world’s, most successful computer line.6 It
was a proud company, and its anthem went as follows:
EVER ONWARD -- EVER ONWARD!
That's the spirit that has brought us fame!
We're big, but bigger we will be
We can't fail for all can see
That to serve humanity has been our aim!
During the 1960s, the “mainframe” was the dominant computer design — one
large computer, covered with blinking lights, designed to handle the most challenging
tasks, or to serve many users at once. There was no such thing as a personal computer:
at that point the cheapest computers sold by IBM cost over $100,000, and the more
expensive units were priced in the millions.
IBM’s design philosophy was characteristic of the era of its greatest success — it
embodied the system design thinking of the 1950s and 1960s, which favored centralized,
fully integrated designs, of which AT&T “Bell System” was the exemplar.7 Hence, IBM’s
mainframe computers integrated, or bundled, all hardware, software and peripherals in
one package. Of particular interest to us, software was not made available for sale or
lease as an independent product: It was a service provided to buyers of IBM hardware.
IBM was not without competitors. The mainframe market was lucrative, and by
the mid-1960s, IBM faced competition from seven smaller firms (the “seven dwarfs”),
with their own mainframes, such as Burroughs, Univac, NCR, CDC, GE, RCA and
Honeywell. Firms like Univac typically targeted the lower end of the mainframe market,
and attempted to win consumers with lower prices. In the early parts of mainframe
history, all of the computers offered for sale were incompatible: that is, a firm usually
bought all of its computers and peripheries from IBM or Univac, for the computers were
incapable of working together. Later, some firms began to offer peripheral hardware, like
disk drives, designed to be “plug-compatible” with IBM’s System/360 mainframes, which
meant one could plug the peripherals into IBM’s machines. Finally, other firms, like
Control Data, focused on superior performance, and in particular, the supercomputer
market, crafting computers faster (and even more expensive) than IBM’s offerings.
II.

The Case

6

Daniela Hernandez, Tech Time Warp of the Week: 50 Years Ago, IBM Unleashed the Room-Sized iPhone,
WIRED (Jun. 27, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/tech-time-warp-ibm-system360/.
7
The centralized design ideology is described in WU, supra note 3, at 45-60.
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Over the 1960s, there were longstanding complaints that IBM was maintaining its
mainframe monopoly and scaring people away from supercomputers using
anticompetitive, predatory, and unethical practices. IBM and its management had faced
antitrust complaints before: Tom Watson Sr., IBM’s longtime CEO, was convicted of
criminal violations of antitrust back in 1913 (when he worked for NCR), and actually
sentenced to prison.8 What’s more, in 1956, IBM entered into a consent decree with the
Justice Department surrounding its leasing practices.9
Matters came to a head when, in 1968, rival Control Data sued IBM in a private
antitrust action, focusing on its predatory conduct in the supercomputer and mainframe
markets.10 In 1969, after a long investigation, the Justice Department filed its own suit,
also charging IBM with monopoly maintenance in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.11 According to the Justice Department, IBM had undertaken “exclusionary and
predatory conduct” to maintain its dominant position in “general purpose digital
computers.”12 That was a market, according to the Government’s estimates, in which IBM
took some 70% of annual revenue.
Most important for our purposes were the Government’s allegations surrounding
software.13 IBM was accused of tying software to “related computer hardware
equipment” for a single price in a manner that Justice alleged to be anticompetitive.
IBM, it was alleged, also gave away software for free for “the purpose or with the effect
of . . . enabling IBM to maintain or increase its market share . . . ."14
Beyond the software practices, the Government also accused IBM of predatory
practices. In particular, it accused IBM of developing specific “fighting machines”
designed not to make a profit but rather to intimidate would-be competitors. It also
accused IBM of vaporware practices, that is, announcing “future production and
marketing [of certain products] when it believed or had reason to believe that it was
unlikely to be able to produce and market such products within the announced time
frame . . . .”
For these violations, the Government sought divestiture — that is, a full breakup
of IBM into constituent parts. In that sense, the case was a classic example of the “big
8

Kevin Maney, The Maverick and His Machine: Thomas Watson, Sr. and the Making of IBM (2003).
Id. at 423.
10
James Cortada, IBM: The Rise and Fall and Reinvention of a Global Icon, 332-333 (2019).
11
Complaint is reprinted in the appendix of FRANKLIN M. FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED AND MUTILATED:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. V. IBM 353 (1983).
12
Plaintiff's Statement of Triable Issues (dated Sep. 23, 1974), United States v. IBM, 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
13
See Amended Complaint, U.S v. IBM, 69 Civ. 200, ¶ 19(a) (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
14
Plaintiff's Statement, supra note 8.
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case” tradition in antitrust, in the model of the Northern Securities or Standard Oil
litigation, whose goal was to restructure the industry entirely.15
After some six years of discovery, the case finally went to trial in 1975. The early
stages of the trial were somewhat complicated by the fact that IBM was also defending
the private antitrust lawsuit brought by Control Data, the manufacturer of
supercomputers. At the beginning, Control Data actively cooperated with the Justice
Department, and had accumulated a massive database of alleged predatory acts by IBM
and its salesmen over the 1960s. It was information from this file that the Justice
Department hoped to deploy in its lawsuit. However, in 1973, Control Data settled with
IBM, and agreed to hand over its file.16 IBM immediately destroyed (in some accounts
burned) the files, thereby setting back the Justice Department’s discovery.
During the trial, IBM put on a vigorous defense, and spent untold millions of
1970s dollars defending the case.17 The judge, David Edelstein, permitted the calling of a
seemingly unlimited number of witnesses, for indefinite periods of time. One
Government witness testified for more than six months. Other trial days consisted of
reading of depositions into the record.18 Many of these details were chronicled by legal
writer Steven Brill, in a scathing piece that portrayed the entire trial as a complete fiasco,
or, in his words, “a farce of such mindboggling proportions that any lawyer who now
tries to find out about it … will be risking the same quicksand that devoured the lawyers
involved in the case.”19 The trial continued for an astonishing six years, until Justice
finally rested in 1981.20
But here we are interested less in the trial itself, and more in the effects of the
litigation on IBM’s conduct and decision making. For during the lengthy trial and its
aftermath, there is little dispute among business historians and journalists that IBM’s
management was influenced by the very fact of being under investigation and being at
trial. As Don Waldman writes, “the filing and prosecution of the antitrust case affected
IBM’s business behavior for the next twenty years.”21 Furthermore, as he writes, “lawyers
gained control over even the most technical elements of IBM”s business.”22 William
Kovacic concurs: “DOJ's law-suit exacted a high price from IBM. Along with the private
15

See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (forthcoming 2018).
James Cortada, IBM: The Rise and Fall and Reinvention of a Global Icon, 333 (2019).
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Id. at 331.
18
See FISHER, supra note 7, at 16.
19
Brill, supra note 1, at 1.
20
Peter Behr, IBM, Justice Rests Cases In Historic Antitrust Trial, WASH. POST (Jun. 2, 1981), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1981/06/02/ibm-justice-rests-cases-in-historicantitrust-trial/5cc16db0-8e7f-4763-a17d-fdfb6fef0464/?noredirect=on.
21
Don Waldman, IBM, in Market Dominance: How Firms Gain, Hold, Or Lose it and the Impact on
Economic Performance at 140 (David Ira Rosenbaum, ed., 1998).
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lawsuits, the DOJ case caused IBM to elevate the role of lawyers in shaping commercial
strategy and seems to have led the firm to pull its competitive punches.”23 Reporter Paul
Carroll, in his inside account Big Blues, gave a detailed portrayal of the effects of efforts
to avoid strengthening the antitrust case by producing evidence of market share or
anticompetitive conduct. “Lawyers, who were developing a stranglehold on the business,
decided what could be said at meetings. No one could talk about IBM’s market share, or
if they did, they’d talk in meaningless terms, describing the market for word processors
as though it included everything from the supercomputer on down to paper and pencils.
Executives couldn’t do any competitive analysis. Developers weren’t allowed to buy a
competitor’s machine; they were just supposed to know what was in it.”24
Critics have emphasized the sheer size of the case, which did last an astonishing
13 years, at the end of which, the Reagan Administration simply dropped the case.25 Was
it, then, all just a waste of resources? That’s no trip to the county courthouse, and no
one can defend how the Justice Department managed the litigation, which became as
bloated as a 1970s muscle car. On the other hand, consider the stakes: The computer
and software industries were already bringing in billions in revenue and today are
collectively worth trillions of dollars, encompassing many of the most valuable
companies on earth. Small effects on this industry would and did have major long term
effects. Nor was the IBM case, as G. David Garson writes, “without its effects” for the
early computing industry.26
III.

Effects and Impact

It is one thing to suggest that the IBM trial may have caused IBM to behave more
cautiously, evade obvious anticompetitive conduct, and generally avoid strengthening
Justice’s case. Among other things, that may have just weakened IBM as a competitor.
But it seems more important to point out specific decisions and outcomes that seem to
have been strongly influenced by the “antitrust phobia” resulting from being the subject
of a Sherman Act case designed to break up the company. In this section I focus on three
key moments: (1) IBM’s unbundling of software from hardware, (2) its entry into the
microcomputer market, IBM PC, in partnership with Microsoft and others, and (3) its
pattern of non-acquisitions in the aftermath of the PC’s success.
1. Unbundling and the Rise of an Independent Software Industry

23

Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker, Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts,
and Problems in Competition Policy 1112 (2008).
24
PAUL CARROLL, BIG BLUES: THE UNMAKING OF IBM 57 (1994).
25
James Cortada, IBM: The Rise and Fall and Reinvention of a Global Icon, 346 (2019).
26

G. David Garson, Public Information Technology and E-governance: Managing the Virtual State 229
(2006).
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The clearest impact of the antitrust case was its contribution to the rise of an
independent software industry. Nor is this development a small matter, given that the
software industry today is a $1.2 trillion-dollar industry in the US ($3 trillion globally),
employing 2.5 million people. However, most of the legal and economics critics of the
IBM litigation have, unaccountably, failed to acknowledge the case’s contribution to the
software industry.
In the 1960s, it was IBM’s practice, and the practice of most other mainframe
manufacturers, to “bundle” software with hardware.27 That is, software was sold as a
service that was tied to the sale of its hardware — the IBM mainframe unit came with a
contract by which IBM programmers wrote software customized to the needs of the
customer. Any pre-packaged software was merely meant to illustrate for the customer
what software might look like, like a model home for a prospective customer.28 There
were those within IBM who also thought that there might be a profitable market for
packaged software, but they were unable to persuade the firm to break from its
traditional practices.29 The software industry itself was a “small, offbeat, almost cottage
industry” and there was, interestingly, little customer demand for independent
software.30
In the late 1960s, as it became apparent that the Justice Department was planning
on bringing an antitrust lawsuit, IBM’s legal team began to conclude, as a legal matter,
that the software-hardware tie would be difficult to defend. A key figure was IBM’s
general counsel, Burke Marshall, who “saw bundling as a glaring violation of antitrust
law” and suggested that, if forced to defend the tie, IBM “would lose.”31 Faced with this
assessment, and hoping for a quick settlement, IBM President and CEO Thomas Watson
Jr. made the decision, late in 1968, to begin the process of unbundling IBM’s software
offerings from its hardware offerings.32 While the unbundling decision was made before
the formal filing of complaint, it was an effort to avoid the complaint being filed; such
27

In antitrust jargon, bundling and tying are differentiated by the idea that tying is non-optional, while a
bundle allows the customer to buy the constituent products separately, or in a (usually cheaper) bundle.
However, in business usage, the two terms are used interchangeably, and in this piece “bundling” is used
as a synonym for “tying.”
28
Burton Grad, A Personal Recollection: IBM's Unbundling of Software and Services, 24 IEEE ANNALS OF THE
HISTORY OF COMPUTING 64, 66 (2002).
29
Id. at *67.
30
Stanley Gibson, Software Industry Born with IBM's Unbundling, COMPUTERWORLD, at 6 (Jun. 19, 1989).
31
THOMAS J. WATSON JR. & PETER PETRE, FATHER, SON & CO.: MY LIFE AT IBM AND BEYOND (1990). . There
were also some within IBM who thought that the firm was missing out on an opportunity to make money
in software. See Grad, supra note 17, at 65.
32
There was, at some point, controversy over what caused IBM to unbundle software. In 1983, Fisher,
McKie, and Mancke disputed the argument that it was antitrust pressure, and suggested that cutting the
costs of support was the primary motive. See FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JAMES W. MCKIE, & RICHARD B. MANCKE,
IBM AND THE U.S. DATA PROCESSING INDUSTRY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1983). However, later admission in
Watson’s autobiography and corroboration by insiders like Grad seems to have ended the controversy.
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efforts to settle preemptively as is common in antitrust practice. 33 If there was once
some controversy over why IBM unbundled, Watson’s description of the decision, in his
autobiography, coupled with the writings of other IBM insiders, seems to have settled the
matter.
On June 23, 1969, — sometimes called the “independence day” for the software
industry — IBM, for the first time, made 17 applications independently available for
lease (not yet for sale). With the first release of prepackaged software products by the
world’s dominant computer firm, the world of computing was never the same again.
Richard Lilly, founder of a prominent 1970s software firm, said in 1989, “It created the
industry we’re in.”34
Consistent with Lilly’s statement, most experts agree that IBM’s unbundling was
one key factor in the development of an independent software industry.35 Nonetheless, a
few caveats are in order. First, it is not that IBM was the first firm to release software as
a product — there were others, albeit very few. By becoming the largest firm to enter the
industry itself, IBM played a role in validating the idea that software could be a product
at all, and also the idea that software was valuable. Second, it is also true that there were
other factors necessary for the birth of a software industry. One was IBM’s own
development of the 360-mainframe architecture, which was a standardized platform;
another, the rise of the minicomputer, a smaller and cheaper alternative to the
mainframe. Nonetheless, in its action, IBM both gave life to the industry and, critically,
reconceptualized what software was. Its unbundling, as Martin Campbell-Kelly writes,
transformed “almost overnight the common perception of software from a free good to a
tradable commodity.”36 The decision also had important consequences for IBM, both in
terms of who it was and what it could control. As Burton Grad, of IBM, writes: “As a
consequence of unbundling, IBM unquestionably became the largest supplier of
computer software and services during the 1970s and 1980s. However, it never could
control that business in the same way that it had (and has) dominated the mainframe
hardware market.”37 The ongoing antitrust suit, moreover, prevented IBM from rebundling and risking new liability. Hence, the suit and the unbundling helped create the
model of computing that drove development through the 1970s and beyond — the
concept of a platform for which applications are developed.
33

For example, in the 2010s, when under FTC investigation, Google preemptively abandoned several
practices that investigators had deemed anticompetitive. See
https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822150/google-ftc-yelp-scraping-antitrust-ftc.
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Gibson, supra note 19, at 6.
35
See, e.g., Grad, supra note 17; see also W. Edward Steinmueller, The U.S. Software Industry: An Analysis
and Interpretive History, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SOFTWARE INDUSTRY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
INDUSTRY EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE (David C. Mowery ed., 1995).
36
Martin Campbell-Kelly, Development and Structure of the International Software Industry, 1950-1990, 24
BUS. & ECON. HISTORY 73, 88 (1995).
37
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Estimating the economic importance of this development — and the contribution
of IBM’s unbundling — is not easy, if only because the transformation was so far
reaching. An important fact, however, is that the impact was not felt all at once.
Hardware continued to be more important than software, and even into the 1980s, the
software industry remained relatively small. One economic analysis suggests that “in
1987, the receipts of U.S. software programming service companies (SIC 7371) were
$14.2 billion, the receipts for computer integrated systems design (SIC 7373) were $7.1
billion, and the receipts from prepackaged software (SIC 7372) sales were $5.9 billion.”38
Other developments, like the triumph of the personal computer over all aspects of
business computing, were yet to come. Yet by the 2010s, providers of software, even
narrowly construed, were responsible for over a trillion dollars in U.S. revenue, and
broadly construed, far more of the world’s economic activity. In the words of Marc
Andreessen, “software is eating the world.”39
We cannot know for sure whether, without IBM’s decision, software would have
become unbundled anyhow — that it was, in some way, the natural order of things. But
it seems hard to deny that the antitrust case sped that development. And the failure to
take account of the significance and effect of IBM’s unbundling of its software is a major
flaw in many of the critiques of the IBM litigation. Take, for example, the work of
economic historians Robert W. Crandall and Charles L. Jackson and their highly skeptical
analysis of the effects of the IBM antitrust litigation, published in 2011, on the
computing industry. The two do mention that unbundling was among the Justice
Department’s goals, yet fail to even mention that Justice actually achieved this goal. That
omission allows them to make the incorrect conclusion that “It is difficult to see how an
antitrust action brought in 1969 and dismissed in 1982 could have been a major
contributor”40 to dramatic changes in the industry.
***
If unbundling succeeded in transforming the history of computing, unfortunately
for Watson and IBM, it failed in its goal of mollifying the Justice Department, which
persisted with other claims of predation and anticompetitive behavior. It seems that
Justice continued to litigate based on its large collection of potentially predatory
activities — in particular, related to pricing and misleading consumers about IBM’s
forthcoming supercomputers (a vaporware strategy). The persistence of the lawsuit led
to its influence over another transformational development: the arrival of the personal
computer.
2.

The Personal Computer and Microsoft
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Another major development that occurred during the pendency of the IBM
antitrust lawsuit was the development of the personal computer industry. While Apple
and competitors Commodore and Tandy may have ignited the market with the successful
launch of the first mass market personal computers, IBM would come to play a central
role by developing and releasing the IBM PC, the personal computer whose design would
come to dominate the market, with its radically modular, or open, design. This section
examines the influence of IBM’s “antitrust phobia” over the core decisions made during
this period.
There are two dominant, yet conflicting, narratives surrounding the development
of the personal computer. The first lionizes IBM’s rapid creation of a personal computer
that would come to dominate the new industry. The second describes a blundering IBM,
and credits Bill Gates for his brilliant outwitting of a myopic and foolish IBM based on an
inability by the latter to understand the future. It isn’t hard to see the contradiction: if
IBM was too stupid or backward to understand the personal computer market, how did
they come to dominate it in just a few years? And if Bill Gates had such a brilliant sense
of the future, why did he only grudgingly come to understand the potential in selling a
standardized operating system? But most mysterious of all, once the IBM PC began to
take off, why was it so inert in the defense of its position — why, for example, did it
decline to acquire control of the companies critical to the PC, as IBM’s philosophy of
centralized control would suggest? The point of this section is not to suggest that the
traditional narrative is entirely wrong, but that it is incomplete. Particularly when it
comes to Microsoft, it implies that IBM was simply too bone-headed to appreciate the
future, rather than, potentially, concerned about its fate in the antitrust trial, and later,
the possibility of reigniting antitrust litigation. There were so many dogs that did not
bark during the launch of the PC and its aftermath, many of which are consistent with a
fear that too aggressive a posture might yield renewed antitrust pressures based on the
monopolization of the PC markets or software.
A moment, first, on the IBM PC itself and its significance. IBM, as already
discussed, was the great champion of the mainframe computer – “big iron,” the monster
machines designed to serve the needs of an entire business unit. (To be fair, mainframes
were actually much smaller than the computers of the 1950s, which sometimes took up
entire buildings, and were mainly employed by the military, but that is another matter.)
Priced in the millions, they were obviously not intended for home usage. In the late
1960s through the 1970s, however, a number of researchers, particularly those
associated with Xerox’s Palo Alto research center, and hobbyists like Steve Jobs and
Steve Wozniak, had come up with the idea of a “personal” computer, intended for
individual usage or for small businesses. A group of firms, led by Apple and its
introduction of the Apple II, and also including Commodore, Atari, Sinclair, Tandy, and
others, had by the 1970s proved both that personal computers could be produced for less
than $2,000, and that there was a market for them.
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IBM had experimented with smaller, entry level computers, but in the main they
were smaller versions of its mainframes, and still priced way beyond the reach of any
individual. In 1980, with the success of Apple and others, IBM decided to enter the
microcomputer market in earnest. In an impressive 12 months, it had introduced the
IBM PC, coupled with an advertising campaign featuring Charlie Chaplin’s “Little
Tramp.” More powerful than the Apple II or Commodore 64, and soon the beneficiary of
a “killer app” in the VisiCalc and then Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program for businesses,
the PC would soon become the best-selling personal computer in history to that point,
and the dominance of its design had a profound influence on the subsequent history of
computing.
What made that design so interesting is that the IBM PC was built in a manner
unlike any other IBM product, a fact that would have enormous long term consequences
for the industry. As suggested earlier, IBM, whose system design traditions dated from
the 1950s, has been among the champions of a fully-integrated system design. Like
AT&T, the company whose design philosophy was the most similar, IBM had long
believed that the best products required that every component and service be provided
in-house. Its practice of bundling, stated differently, was not limited to software; it
included all hardware as well — it tended to source all of its hardware and software
from itself.
The first IBM PC, however, was an extraordinarily radical break from that design,
with a modular, open design philosophy that was essentially the opposite of IBM’s closed
and centralized philosophy. The IBM PC team (as we shall see, an experimental subunit
of IBM proper) selected a hard-drive manufactured by Seagate, a printer made by Epson,
a processor made by Intel, instead of its own processors. Most importantly over the long
term, an operating system provided by the company then named “Micro-Soft,” then a
small startup, headed by a Bill Gates who was just 24 at the time and lacking a college
degree. Gates, for his part, did not in fact write the operating system, but acquired it
from a partner (Seattle Software) for whom he paid a license of $25,000 (reportedly, he
didn’t mention to Seattle Software that the customer was IBM, nor that it had paid him
$700,000).41 In the end, when the PC came out, only the keyboard, screen,
motherboard, and its hardware BIOS (Basic Input Output System) were actually
produced by IBM’s internal divisions. Of those, only the BIOS was proprietary.
There is one competitive detail of particular importance in the story of the IBM
PC. When IBM contracted with Microsoft to provide the main operating system for the
computer,42 it neither bought the rights to the software nor required an exclusive license.
The agreement was, instead, non-exclusive, leaving Microsoft free to sell its MS-DOS to
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other computer manufacturers as well. This non-exclusivity was a crucial factor in
facilitating competition in the market for IBM-compatible PCs (like Compaq, or Dell).
But this is something of a tangent. The question this paper is trying to assess is what role,
if any, the antitrust investigation played in influencing IBM’s original design and
subsequent strategic conduct. Unlike unbundling, the causation is much more diluted,
but not unimportant.
First, we do need return back to the original 1969 software unbundling and its
effect on the development of the personal computer. Among the effects of IBM’s prior
unbundling decision was to create the conditions for the platform/application model that
would become the foundation of the personal computer industry. Burton Grad, again,
writes that “[u]nbundling mainframe software established a framework for the
independent microcomputer software industry’s later growth, which followed the model
of separately priced offerings by major software suppliers.”43 In other words, perhaps the
larger influence of unbundling in 1969 was setting a model for firms like Microsoft,
VisiCalc and Lotus (the latter two being among the first spreadsheet producers) to
follow, which were a major factor in the success of the IBM PC. The unbundling also
made possible Microsoft, who we shall discuss in greater detail in a moment.
The second matter was the question of how IBM would come to enter the market
for personal computers. A dominant view is that the industry had too little revenue to
attract or interest a mighty firm like IBM. However, there is evidence that, as early as the
mid-1970s, IBM management, including its Chairman, had gained interest in low-cost,
entry-level computers, based on the accurate perception that lower cost computers
would come to be important, and also that rival Xerox might dominate that market.
(Xerox had developed an advanced personal computer, the Alto, by 1973, that even had
a graphical user interface, but kept it for internal usage, and did not bring a computer to
market until the mid-1980s.) IBM considered the acquisitions that might help it forestall
the emergence of competitors, but that path was discouraged by its lawyers, who were at
that point involved in every level of decision making. For example, IBM considered the
acquisition of Atari, and later considered working with Atari to produce its PC, but never
did so — whether out of antitrust concerns or not, is unclear.
The IBM PC’s production was also influenced by IBM’s internal restructuring. By
the late 1970s, both in the hope of promoting innovation, and also in anticipation of a
potential breakup, IBM had divided the firm. Frank Cary, IBM’s CEO, created a separate
division to contain all of IBM’s non-mainframe businesses, and it was in this division that
the PC was launched. More specifically, IBM created a series of independent business
units designed to be innovative and also potential survivors of a breakup, just as AT&T
concentrated its choice assets (or so it thought). It was one of these, the “entry level
computing” division based in Boca Raton, Florida, that both proposed and then built the
IBM PC (codenamed Project Chess).
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It is this team that made the decisions to create the modular and open design
already discussed. That decision, in turn, is said to have been somewhat inspired by both
Wozniak’s Apple II design as well as the Chess team’s desire to get around IBM’s slowmoving methodical culture and arrive to market quickly and cheaply. The evidence
leaves little doubt that this was the primary reason behind the design. As Bill Lowe, the
first head of the PC team, later said, “at IBM it would take four years and three hundred
people to do anything, I mean it's just a fact of life. And I said no sir, we can provide with
product in a year. …To save time, instead of building a computer from scratch, [the
team] would buy components off the shelf and assemble them -- what in IBM speak was
called ‘open architecture.’ IBM never did this.”44 Lowe explained that “the key decisions
were to go with an open architecture, non-IBM technology, non-IBM software, non-IBM
sales and non-IBM service.”
But while speed was surely a predominant factor in the design, it does not provide
an explanation for everything. It fails to explain certain matters, like the crucial
agreement to a non-exclusive license for Microsoft’s PC-DOS (an exclusive contract
would not have been faster), and to leave Microsoft with full control of the source code.
Those who have studied that agreement and its creators have tended to focus on Bill
Gates’ side of the story, and attribute to him great savvy and foresight, based mainly on
his own testimony.45 While seeing the potential in the operating system and in nonexclusivity deserves enormous credit, it doesn’t explain why IBM would agree to such a
thing. It takes two parties to reach agreement, and as a small firm negotiating with the
dominant computing power, it is safe to say that Microsoft would not necessarily have
the final say. We also have the fact that IBM made an offer to buy a competing operating
system, CP/M, outright.46 What is lacking is a reason for IBM’s non-assertion of its
market power, and the implicit assumption that IBM was simply too stupid or shortsighted is an inadequate explanation.
The studies of IBM’s side of the deal and its motivations for agreeing to nonexclusivity are fewer, but more important for our purposes. Joseph Porac, in a
comprehensive study of the deal, suggests a variety of factors. One was that IBM did not
want to manage the code or develop the operating system itself, having had several bad
experiences with doing so in recent years. But the other leading reason, according to
Porac, was “antitrust phobia.” As he writes, “[A] reluctance to overcontrol small
companies that could become potential competitors [was an] offshoot of the company’s
antitrust phobia. Signing a nonexclusive contract with Microsoft that was clearly to
Microsoft’s benefit was one way of avoiding any future claim that IBM was dominating
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the personal computer market.”47 His assertion is echoed by Charles Ferguson and
Charles Morris, who write, “because of the still-pending antitrust action, IBM was wary
of owning operating system software for fear of suits from software writers” for “IBM
was extremely sensitive to even the appearance of having an unfair advantage over a
small supplier.”48
It is difficult, in the final analysis, to deny that IBM’s antitrust lawyers strongly
influenced elements of the legal and technical design of the IBM PC, for it was essentially
antitrust-proof. Indeed, after IBM’s successful rise to dominance in the PC market, there
was some complaining about “IBM dominance” but no serious antitrust scrutiny or
assertion that the firm had employed tying or other exclusionary strategies. The
avoidance of even a hint of exclusivity in the design is notable. It is the non-assertion of
market power or obvious failures to protect itself from competition that suggest a firm
exceptionally intent on avoiding anything that might strengthen the antitrust case
against it. Unfortunately for IBM, but fortunately for the economy, the very design of the
PC made it much harder for IBM to control the PC market.
3.

The Non-Acquisitions, and More Dogs that Did Not Bark

In 1984, after the success of its PC, IBM was unquestionably the world’s dominant
computer firm. In fact, at that point, IBM was the world’s single most valuable company,
its stock price rising to $79 billion by the end of that year. It had upended the personal
computer industry, and achieved, for a while, a dominant market share in that market.
The last point we consider, in terms of the lasting effects of antitrust scrutiny, was IBM’s
astonishing failure to take some of the classic measures used by a monopolist to defend
its market position.
As already suggested, IBM entered the market in a manner that can only be
described as unusually and exceptionally stimulating to competition, and indeed in a
manner that breathed life into firms and nascent industries. The level of competition
ended up being much greater than IBM could possibly have anticipated. Some of this
was surely a blunder on the part of IBM. A key matter was IBM’s assumption that its
ownership of the BIOS code would protect it from those seeking to create 100% IBM
compatibles, based on the premise that it might use copyright infringement lawsuits to
block any direct copies. However, Compaq and other firms effectively reverse-engineered
and cloned IBM’s BIOS, using clean-lab techniques (that is, its engineers had no access to
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the relevant code).49 This development, which IBM clearly did not anticipate, created a
major breach in the barriers to competition it thought it had, and yielded a flourishing
PC market from the 1980s onward.
An easier way to protect its dominance would have been control over Microsoft’s
DOS, and we have already discussed IBM’s decision not to insist that the Microsoft’s
DOS be exclusive to IBM, or even partially exclusive. That single decision, as many have
noted, might have ensured a far longer domination of the PC market for the firm. But
even if this might have been, in part, at least an oversight, it is hard to explain IBM’s
subsequent non-acquisition of PC-DOS, of Microsoft, or even of a share of Microsoft,
without crediting some concern of renewed antitrust problems.
50

In the 1990s, reporters first revealed that, in fact, IBM was offered various
opportunities to buy Microsoft or its software. In 1980, according to the Wall Street
Journal, Microsoft offered to let IBM buy its operating system outright, an opportunity
that IBM declined, for the reasons discussed above. Later, in 1986, after the IBM PC had
successfully taken over personal computing, Bill Gates offered IBM the opportunity to
buy 10% of Microsoft.51 There is some reason to think that, while surely the price would
have been steep, IBM might have even have tried to acquire Microsoft in its entirety. IBM
— still the most valuable firm in the world — demurred, concerned that its purchase
would re-ignite antitrust concerns by being seen as “throwing its weight around.”52 Paul
Carroll reports Bill Lowe of the PC team stating that “IBM didn’t want to be seen as
dominating the PC market too thoroughly.”53
Given the runaway success of the PC, it was also plausible that an IBM that was
behaving more like Facebook, Microsoft, or other less inhibited giants would have sought
to either acquire or clone the other units, including hard drive manufacturer Seagate,
and Epson. However, it made no efforts whatsoever to acquire these actors, who would
go on to earn most of the profits in the PC industry.
***
The various design decisions surrounding the IBM PC and IBM’s subsequent
failure to defend its position are of such great importance over the long term for both the
computer industry and the entire high-tech economy that they must be carefully
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examined.54 We have already noted that the non-proprietary design left the market open
to challengers to the IBM PC who manufactured cheaper but compatible computers, also
using MS-DOS. Over the long run, this development would erode IBM’s early dominance.
But more generally, an important consequence was the fostering of a whole series of new
and independent industries: an industry for hard-drives and other forms of storage,
another for processors and memory, and, of course, the market for personal computer
software. It is true that these industries existed previously, but their growth was
catalyzed by the IBM PC and its later competitors. It is interesting to contrast the PC, in
this respect, with Apple, the previous leader, who was slightly less open than IBM, and
with the launch of the Apple Macintosh, retreated to an entirely closed architecture with
most components manufactured by Apple. In an alternative universe where IBM stayed
out, and some version of the Apple Macintosh became the dominant business computer,
it is very possible that the storage and software industries, in particular, would have been
greatly reduced in independence and significance.
IV.

Lessons for Enforcers

Today, the concentration of the high tech industries has become, one again, a
matter of major public concern. That’s why the IBM case merits careful study by
enforcers, for it was the first major tech antitrust case of the computing era, and a
neglected member of the big three cases of the late 20th century (IBM, AT&T and
Microsoft). Close study of the case offers guidance and insight into what might be the
dynamic justifications for bringing a major antitrust lawsuit in the 2020s.
IBM was just one company. Yet, in retrospect, it was sitting atop of what turned
out to be an enormous number of important industries, from software through storage,
processing and operating systems. The subsequent flourishing of the industries which
were once in areas controlled, or potentially controlled, by IBM has unquestionably
transformed the modern economy.
Given the complexity of any historical period, it is almost always impossible to
claim that one factor — one leader, one case, one invention or one critical decision —
changed everything. However, it is not impossible to claim a contribution or a catalysis.
And even if we don’t know what would have happened in the absence of antitrust — if,
in fact, software might have been unbundled anyhow, or the PC might have developed
more or less the same, there is good reason to believe that the pervasive evidence of
antitrust phobia hastened the outcome.
If an enforcer wanted to duplicate the catalytic effects of the IBM case, what
would he or she do? A close look at the history recommends that antitrust enforcers,
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particularly when thinking about big Section 2 cases, should spend time thinking about
what industries or potential future markets and industries the dominant firm sits on top
of or can potentially control the development of. The intuition is that there is a
difference, say, between a shoe monopoly and monopoly on sidewalks, given that the
latter might be an input into and entwined in so many other businesses. This suggests
that antitrust enforcers should, when considering cases, begin by thinking about how
many markets are influenced or dependent on the product or service.
A similar logic suggests prioritizing Sherman 2 cases where the problem isn’t just
competition in the primary market, but where competition in adjacent markets looks to
be compromised or threatened. The long cycles of industrial history suggest that what
are at one point seen as adjacent or side industries can sometimes emerge to become of
primary importance, as in the example of software and hardware. Hence, the manner of
how something is sold can make a big difference. In particular, “bundling” or “tying” one
product to another can stunt the development of an underlying industry. Even a tie that
seems like “one product” at the time the case is litigated, as, for example, software and
hardware were in the 1960s, or physical telephones and telephone lines, might
contribute to such stunting. If successful, an antitrust prosecution that breaks the tie and
opens a long-dominated market to competition may serve to have very significant long
term effects.
While all things are clearer in retrospect, the existence of a cottage or nascent
industry might serve as a clue that, in fact, a vibrant industry might emerge from
breaking the tie. If some firms manage to survive even in the presence of a tie, that
suggests the possibility that there is far more potential there. In the example of the
software industry, as we’ve suggested, the concept of pre-packaged software existed, and
a scattering of firms sold it and made a profit thereby. That pattern suggested plenty of
room to grow, even if it would take many years for pre-made software to develop into
the thriving industry it became.
A last lesson that might be gleaned from the IBM litigation is this: If the
government wants to spur a change in conduct, it should seek maximum remedies in the
cases it brings. In IBM, the Justice Department brought a complaint seeking dissolution
— a full structural remedy. IBM’s concern about such a remedy had a major effect on its
thinking and decision-making, and seemed to yield the antitrust phobia that proved
important over the 1970s. That suggests that Justice cannot induce improved behavior
without making credible threats of punishment at the outset of the case. In particular,
there is a risk that a case that begins seeking a mere consent decree might not have any
real effect on firm conduct.
A full discussion of what should go into case selection is beyond the scope of this
or perhaps any article. But the final caveat or warning is this: While I think it is correct to
suggest that the costs of litigation should not be fetishized — though the millions matter
less when billions are at stake — one thing that does matter are the effects on the
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company itself. IBM was, arguably, a reduced entity during the antitrust case (though it
remained extremely profitable, and actually quadrupled its stock price). Knowing that
the effect of litigation is to damage the firm, the enforcer needs to have some confidence
that the damage will be salutary — that is, it will yield room for competitors to take the
ball and run with it. While “do not harm” cannot be the mantra of antitrust enforcement,
no one should seek outcomes that make things worse. And this is what makes timing
all-important, and suggests that enforcement policy will always be a matter requiring
above all, good judgment and a clear eye toward what one hopes to achieve.
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